This paper analyzes situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not realized according to plan. If the project is expedited, a reward arises. Analogously, a penalty arises if the project is delayed. This paper considers the case of arbitrary monotonic reward and penalty functions on the total expedition and delay, respectively. Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a corresponding cooperative project game determines a set of stable allocations of the total reward (penalty). In the definition of project games, surplus (cost) sharing mechanisms are used to take into account the specific characteristics of the reward (penalty) function at hand. It turns outs that project games are related to bankruptcy and taxation games. This relation allows us to establish the nonemptiness of the core of project games.
below.
A usual case of penalties associated to delayed projects can be found in the building of a house. When a company is hired to build a house, there is usually a clause in the contract in which a penalty for the company is agreed upon if the house is finished later than planned. If the company has contracted out some specialized jobs to other firms, and these firms have incurred some delay, it is important to know for which part of the penalty these firms can be hold responsible.
An example of rewards associated to expedited projects can be found in projects ordered by a government.
During the term of office of a government, it has been decided to build a new hospital in a city. For political reasons (e.g. the approach of new elections), the government wants it to be finished before the planned time.
As an incentive, a bonus is promised if the works are expedited. In such a case it is important to know which activities (and therefore the companies involved in such activity) are responsible of the final expedition in order to allocate the bonus.
In practice, activities are often entrusted to different companies. If the project is delayed or expedited, an allocation problem arises: how to share the penalty (in case of delay) or the reward (in case of expedition) among the various activities and its corresponding companies. Cooperative games are a mathematical tool to provide an answer to this type of allocation problems. The focus of our study will be on defining a game in an adequate way and analyzing the corresponding core. The core of a game (Gillies (1953) ) provides allocations of the total penalty or the total reward that are stable, i.e. no group of activities can reasonably object to allocations in the core. The interaction between operations research and cooperative game theory already goes back to the seventies, for a survey on the topic see Borm, Hamers and Hendrickx (2001) .
The main focus in the literature on project problems has been on delayed project problems. Branzêi, Ferrari, Fragnelli and Tijs (2002) study delayed project problems in the framework of taxation problems and propose a specific allocation rule. Bergantiños and Sánchez (2002) , analyze two other allocation rules for delayed project problems. A common feature in these papers is however that game theoretical aspects are only indirectly present in analyzing the allocation problem at hand. Estévez-Fernández, Borm and Hamers (2007) is the first paper to approach the related allocation problem from a direct game theoretical point of view. Moreover, Estévez-Fernández et al. (2007) is the first article where both delayed and expedited project problems are analyzed. Still, the paper is restricted to project problems where the penalty (reward) function is proportional with respect to the total delay (expedition) of the project. An important aspect of Estévez-Fernández et al. (2007) is that it provides the tools to obtain "fair" allocations of the corresponding penalty or reward by explicitly considering the structure of the project, i.e. the interconnections among the different activities.
In this paper, we extend the work in Estévez-Fernández et al. (2007) by analyzing project problems with arbitrary but monotonic penalty and reward functions. As in Estévez-Fernández et al. (2007) , this is done by defining project games associated to project problems and considering the corresponding core as the solution set to the underlying allocation problem. Here, two stages are needed to define project games for monotonic penalty (reward) functions. In the first stage cost (surplus) sharing problems are used. As a first approach to share the penalty (reward) of a project, we look at each path in the project separately and we share the penalty (reward) that the path can be held responsible of among its activities by making use of a cost (surplus) sharing mechanism which is chosen by taking into account the specific characteristics of the penalty (reward) function at hand. In this first stage, the total amount shared among all the activities may exceed the total penalty (reward) of the project, hence a second stage is needed to exactly obtain allocations of the total penalty (reward). In the second stage, a project game is defined in the spirit of Estévez-Fernández et al. (2007) using the allocations obtained in the first stage.
For clarity of exposition, we have divided our study on project problems in three parts. First, we study delayed project problems, which are project problems in which the project has been delayed and none of the activities has been expedited. Second, we analyze expedited project problems, where a project has been expedited and none of the activities has been delayed. To conclude, we turn our attention to general project problems, in which activities in a project may be either delayed or expedited, possibly bringing a difference on the overall planned time for the project.
Our main result is that project games have a nonempty core. Moreover, it turns out that the games associated to delayed project problems can be described as the maximum of as many taxation games as paths in the project. On the other hand, the games associated to expedited project problems are convex and can be described as the maximum of a number of bankruptcy games (see O'Neill (1982) ).
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls some basic notions from project problems, cost and surplus sharing problems, cooperative games, and bankruptcy and taxation problems. Sections 3 and 4 are dedicated to delayed project problems and expedited project problems, respectively. Section 5 analyzes general project problems. Section 6 concludes.
Preliminaries 2.1 Projects
A project consists of a set of activities for which the inter-connections are known. These activities are completed over a period of time and intended to achieve a particular aim. Let N denote the set of activities of a project. Given an activity i ∈ N , let P i denote the set of predecessors of i, i.e. the set of activities that have to be processed before i can start. Analogously, let F i be the set of followers of i, i.e. the set of activities that need i to be completed before starting. A project is defined as a collection of ordered subsets of N or paths, {N 1 , . . . , N m }, where a bijection σ a : {1, . . . |N a |} → N a describes the order in N a , a ∈ {1, . . . , m}, satisfying the following conditions:
(ii) F σa(|Na|) = ∅, P σa(1) = ∅, and P σa(r) = {σ a (1), . . . , σ a (r − 1)} for every a ∈ {1, . . . , m} and every r ∈ {2, . . . , |N a |};
Throughout, there is no specific need to explicitly keep track of the ordering. Therefore, σ 1 , . . . , σ m are suppressed from the notations.
Note that a project can be represented by a directed graph where the set of arcs corresponds to the set of activities. In order to avoid multiple arcs, dummy activities are introduced in the graph (a dummy activity is an activity that does not consume neither time nor resources). Dummy activities are represented by a dashed arc.
Example 2.1. Table 1 gives the set of activities of a project with their corresponding predecessors. Here, the set of activities is N = {A, B, C} and the collection of paths is {N 1 , N 2 }, with N 1 = {A, C}, and N 2 = {B, C}. The graphical representation of this project is given in Figure 1 . Table 1 .
Activity Predecessors
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Associated to a project {N 1 , . . . , N m }, there is a duration function l : N → R + with l(i) denoting the length or duration of activity i ∈ N . Given a project {N 1 , . . . , N m } and a duration function l, we define the duration of a path N a according to l, D(N a , l), as the sum of the duration of its activities, i.e.
The duration of the project according to l, D(l), is the maximum duration of its paths,
The slack of N a according to l, slack(N a , l), is the maximum time that the activities of N a can be delayed without altering the duration of the project, i.e. slack(
We say that a path is critical if it has slack zero.
Example 2.2. Consider the project given in Example 2.1 and let l : N → R + be given by l(A) = 15, l(B) = 10, and l(C) = 8. Table 2 summarizes the duration and slack of the paths. Note that D(l) = 23. Throughout, we use a fixed notation for two specific duration functions. We denote by p : N → R + the function representing the planned or estimated time of the activities and by r : N → R + the function giving the real time of the activities after the realization of the project. We define the delay function d : and r(C) = 10. The delay and expedition functions are given in Table 3 . 
Cost sharing and surplus sharing problems
A cost sharing problem is defined by a tuple (N, q, c) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of agents (or players),
+ is a vector of nonnegative numbers, with q i representing the demand of agent i ∈ N , and c : R → R + is a nondecreasing cost function satisfying c(t) = 0 for t ≤ 0. A cost sharing mechanism on a class of cost sharing problems C is a mapping y that assigns to each (N, q, c) ∈ C a vector of cost shares y(N, q, c) ∈ R N + , i.e. i∈N y i (N, q, c) = c( i∈N q i ), satisfying that if q i = 0, then y i (N, q, c) = 0.
Several mechanisms can be found in the literature (see e.g. Koster (1999) ); we recall here one of the most studied cost sharing mechanisms in the literature, the serial cost sharing mechanism, y s . Let (N, q, c) be a cost sharing problem and assume without loss of generality that q 1 ≤ q 2 ≤ . . . ≤ q n , then the serial cost sharing mechanism is defined by
Example 2.4. Let (N, q, c) be a cost sharing problem with N = {1, 2, 3}, q = (2, 5, 6), and c defined by
In this case, c(2 + 5 + 6) = 269 and y s (N, q, c) = (45 Table 4 summarizes the computation of the serial cost sharing rule. The core of a game (N, v) is defined by
i.e. the core is the set of efficient allocations of v(N ) to which no coalition can reasonably object. An important subclass of games with nonempty core is the class of convex games (see Shapley (1971) 
Let (N, c) be a cost game. The corresponding cost savings game (N, v) is defined by
The properties and solutions concepts for cooperative cost games can consequently be derived from the above definitions. The equivalent of a convex game for a cost game is a concave game.
Bankruptcy and taxation problems
A bankruptcy problem is defined by a tuple (N, E, c) where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents (or players), E is the estate that must be shared among the agents, and c ∈ R N is the vector of claims of the agents, satisfying i∈N c i > E. Bankruptcy problems have being firstly studied from a game theoretical viewpoint in O'Neill (1982) . Given a bankruptcy problem (N, E, c), the corresponding bankruptcy game, (N, v (N,E,c) )
is defined by In Curiel et al. (1987) it is shown that bankruptcy games are convex.
Taxation problems can be seen as dual of bankruptcy problems. A taxation problem is defined by a tuple (N, E, c) where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents (or players), E is the tax that must be collected among the agents, and c ∈ R N is the vector of the abilities to pay of the players, satisfying i∈N c i > E. Given a taxation problem (N, E, c), the corresponding taxation game, (N, c (N,E,c) ), is defined by
for every S ⊂ N . In Branzêi et al. (2002) it is shown that taxation games are concave.
Delayed project games
A delayed project problem arises when the planned time of the activities in a project was underestimated, incurring delay of the project. Associated to the delay of the project, there is a non-decreasing penalty function K : R → R + satisfying K(t) = 0 for every t ≤ 0. A delayed project problem can be described by a 4-tuple ({N 1 , . . . , N m }, p, r, K), where p and r satisfy p ≤ r.
When a penalty forms due to the delay of the project, one can think of sharing the delay of the project among the activities in a first (linear) stage and allocating the (possibly nonlinear) penalty among the activities according to the delay they have been held responsible of in a second stage. This approach has already been suggested in Branzêi et al. (2002) . The problem with this procedure is that the specific characteristics of the penalty function may be neglected. We show the inadequacy of this procedure in the following example in which the allocation of the total delay is obtained by considering the core of the game defined in Estévez-Fernández et al. (2007), which we subsequently recall.
The associated (linear) delayed project game, (N,c), is defined bỹ
for S ⊂ N , where P(S) is the set (of indices) of paths in which activities in S are involved, i.e. P(S) = {a ∈ {1, . . . , m}| N a ∩ S = ∅}.
and K(t) = 2t 2 if t > 4. The project is represented in Figure 2 together with the duration of the paths according to the planned and real times. Let us consider (3, 1, 1) as the allocation of the total delay among the activities. In a second stage, we divide the total penalty proportionally to this allocation of responsibilities, as suggested in Branzêi et al. (2002) , giving an allocation of (30, 10, 10). Note that this allocation assigns a total penalty of 30 + 10 = 40
to A and C together, which is more than 16, the penalty associated to the delay induced by
The inadequacy in first sharing delay "responsibilities" among the activities and then the penalty in a second stage is that the characteristics of the penalty function are not reflected on the final share of the total penalty. Our approach will follow the opposite reasoning. We first allocate the penalty associated to the gross delay of each path (i.e. the total delay created by its activities, without taking into account the slack of the path) among its activities. In a second step, we use cooperative games to share the penalty of the project among all its activities, using the initial allocations as reference points.
If activities in a path are delayed and they cause a delay of the project, we can consider this as a cost sharing problem where the demands of the activities are their delays and the cost function is the penalty function. Given a delayed project problem ({N 1 , . . . , N m }, p, r, K), for each a ∈ {1, . . . , m} we consider the cost sharing problem
with q a i = d(i) for every i ∈ N a . Selecting a cost sharing mechanism y by taking into account the type of penalty function at hand, we denote by y a the allocation proposed by our mechanism to the cost sharing problem (N a , q a , K), i.e.
Here, we pessimistically assume that the activities in N a are not allowed to make use of the planned slack in the path and have to pay the cost associated to their total delay. In this way, y a i represents the cost that i is held responsible of for the cost associated to the total delay of the activities in N a . By using these allocations as starting points, we associate a delayed project game to a delayed project problem where the set of players is the set of activities and the cost of a coalition is the maximal amount the coalition can be held responsible of with respect to the different paths involved in the coalition. Formally, given a delayed project problem ({N 1 , . . . , N m } , p, r , K ) and a cost sharing mechanism y, we define the associated cost game (N, c y ) by
for every S ⊂ N . Recall that P(S) = {a ∈ {1, . . . , m}| N a ∩ S = ∅} represents the set of paths in which activities of S are involved.
The game pessimistically assigns to a coalition the maximum penalty that the coalition can be held responsible of, taking into account that the activities in a path should never pay more than neither their initial allocation in the path nor the penalty associated to the net delay of the path (i.e. the total delay of the activities in the path minus the planned slack of the path).
Example 3.2. Consider the delayed project problem given in Example 3.1. Recall that N 1 = {A, C},
, r(C) = 3, and K(t) = 0 if t ≤ 0,
sharing mechanism, we take the serial cost sharing mechanism, then y 1 = y({A, C}, (5, 1), K) = (70, 2) and Next, we show how to compute the value of coalition {A,C}. Note that P(S) = {1, 2} since A,C ∈ N 1 and C ∈ N 2 . Then,
= max{16, 2} = 16.
It can be checked that the core of the game is Core(c y ) = conv{(0, 48, 2), (14, 34, 2)}. Note that this game is not concave by taking i = B, S = {A}, and T = {A, C}. 3
Given a delayed project problem ({N 1 , . . . , N m }, p, r, K) and a cost sharing mechanism y, the associated delayed project game, (N, c y ), can be described as the maximum of as many taxation games as paths in the project, where the taxation problem associated to path a ∈ {1, . . . , m} is (N, E a , c y,a ) (3.1) Proof: Let ({N 1 , . . . , N m }, p, r, K) be a delayed project problem and let y be a cost sharing mechanism. Let a ∈ {1, . . . , m} be such that c y (N ) = c (N,Eā,c y,ā ) (N ). The core of (N, c (N,Eā,c y,ā ) ) is nonempty since taxation games are concave, then we can take x ∈ Core(c (N,Eā,c y,ā ) ) and
where the first equality follows by definition of core element and the second one by assumption. Moreover, for every S ⊂ N we have
where the first inequality follows by definition of core element and the equality is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.1. By equations (3.2) and (3.3) we have that x ∈ Core(c y ). 2
Expedited project games
An expedited project problem forms when the planned time of the activities was overestimated, i.e. the real time of an activity is at most its planned time, bringing expedition to the project. Associated to the expedition of the project, we have a non-decreasing reward function R : R → R + satisfying R(t) = 0 for every t ≤ 0. An expedited project problem can be then described by a 4-tuple ({N 1 , . . . , N m }, p, r, R) where p and r satisfy p ≥ r. At this stage, one may think about using the duality between delayed and expedited project problems: an expedited project problem can be viewed as a delayed project problem by interchanging the planned and real time vectors. This dual approach however is inadequate to solve expedited project games.
For an example see Example 4.1 in Estévez-Fernández et al. (2007) .
As in the case of delayed project problems, when a reward arises due to an expedition of the project, one can think of sharing the expedition of the project among the activities in a first (linear) stage, and allocating the (possibly nonlinear) reward among the activities according to the expedition they have been Note that the critical path N 1 = {A, B} is indispensable to expedite the project. We subsequently explain how this expedition is achieved. Table 7 .
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 N 1 256 9 11 N 2 0 9 11 Note that the sum of the first row gives the total reward. This type of decomposition into levels of expedition plays an important role in the definition of expedited project games. 3
In order to solve expedited project problems, we first optimistically allocate the part of the expedition that each path could contribute to among its activities. In a second step, we use cooperative games to share 13 the total reward among all the activities in the project using for this the initial allocations as reference points.
Before defining expedited project games, we need to introduce some notation. Let ({N 1 , . . . , N m }, p, r, R)
be an expedited project problem. We denote by I 1 the set (of indices) of critical paths according to the planned time. Formally,
Recursively, we define for k ≥ 2,
i.e. I k corresponds to all paths that would be critical in the (sub)project if all the paths in I 1 , . . . , I k−1
were not present. By slack(I k ) we denote the slack of the paths in I k according to the planned time, i.e.
For k = 1, . . . , h, we define F k as the marginal contribution of the paths in I 1 , . . . , I k to the total reward associated to the expedition. Formally,
Next, we define the maximal amount of reward that an activity can claim for itself. For this, we consider for each a ∈ {1, . . . , m} the surplus sharing problem
with p a i = e(i) for every i ∈ N a and
Selecting a surplus sharing mechanism z (taking into account the type of reward function at hand), we denote by z a the allocation proposed by our mechanism to the surplus sharing problem (N a , p a , R a ), i.e.
Here, z a i is the maximum amount that i can claim according to the surplus sharing mechanism if its path is awarded with the total expedition that it can bring to the project. Then, we optimistically define the vector of maximal rewards, f z , by
i.e. f z i is the maximum reward that activity i can claim from the expedition of the project when the surplus sharing mechanism z is considered.
Following the underlying ideas in Estévez-Fernández et al. (2007) , to an expedited project problem we associate an expedited project game where the set of players is the set of activities and the value of a coalition is the sum over all k ∈ {1, . . . , h} of those specific parts of the contribution to the total reward F k for which the activities outside the coalition that are in paths of k l=1 I l cannot be held responsible for anymore at that phase. Formally, given an expedited project problem ({N 1 , . . . , N m } , p, r , R) we define the associated game (N, v z ), where v z is defined by
for every S ⊂ N , where for all k ∈ {1, . . . , h}, w k z (S) is recursively defined by
where reward of R(6) = 276. Besides, e(A) = 3, e(B) = 4, e(C) = 2 and e(D) = 3; I 1 = {1}, I 2 = {2}, and I 3 = {3}; h = 3; F 1 = R(4) − R(0) = 256, F 2 = R(5) − R(4) = 9, and F 3 = R(6) − R(5) = 11.
For the computation of f z , we consider the serial surplus sharing mechanism. Associated to each path N a we have the surplus problem: All coalitional values are given in Table 8 . Given an expedited project problem ({N 1 , . . . , N m }, p, r, R) and a surplus sharing mechanism z, the associated project game (N, v z ) can be expressed as the maximum of as many bankruptcy games as levels of expedition in the project, where the bankruptcy problem associated to level of expedition k ∈ {1, . . . , h} is
otherwise.
Theorem 4.1. Let ({N 1 , . . . , N m }, p, r, R) be an expedited project problem, let z be a surplus sharing mechanism, and let (N, v z ) be the associated expedited project game. Then,
Proof:
We proceed by induction on h. Let h = 1 and S ⊂ N , then
Next, assume that the result is satisfied for 1, . . . , h − 1. Let S ⊂ N , then
where the fourth equality follows by induction, the fifth one is a consequence of max k∈{1,...,h−1} {v (N,E k ,c z,k ) (S)} ≥ 0, and the sixth one follows because Table 9 gives the values of the corresponding bankruptcy games and expedited project game. Note that, by definition of c z,k , we have that c
S
according to realization and that all expedited activities outside the coalition have acted according to plan.
Then, if the expedition given by the expedited activities in the coalition itself is not enough to expedite the duration of the project, the value of the coalition is negative and is determined along the lines of delayed project games. Otherwise, the value of the coalition is positive and is determined along the lines of expedited project games. Formally, given a project problem ({N 1 , . . . , N m } , p, r , R), a cost sharing mechanism y, and a surplus sharing mechanism z, we denote by (N, u yz ) the associated project game, still to be defined formally.
Let E denote the set of expedited activities, i.e. E = {i ∈ N | e(i) > 0}.
, then the expedition carried by the expedited activities in S is not enough to expedite the project andc y (S) reflects the maximum delay the coalition can be held responsible of. For every a ∈ {1, . . . , m}, consider the cost sharing problem
then coalition S cannot be held responsible neither for more than the total cost assigned to it by the cost sharing mechanism, nor for more than the net delay of the path as a consequence of the delay of activities in the path and the expedition of the activities within the coalition. Formally,
r) > 0 and g = 0 otherwise. For k = 1, . . . , g, we define F k as the marginal contribution of the paths in J 1 , . . . , J k to the total reward associated to the expedition. Formally,
For every a ∈ {1, . . . , m}, consider the surplus sharing problem
Note that if the project problem is a delayed project problem, thenc y = c y and u yz = − c y since
Besides, if the project problem is an expedited project problem, then
Given a project problem ({N 1 , . . . , N m }, p, r, R), and a surplus sharing mechanism z, the corresponding game (N,v z ) can be described as the maximum of as many bankruptcy games as levels of expedition in the project, where the bankruptcy problem associated to level of expedition k ∈ {1, . . . , g} is Lemma 5.1. Let ({N 1 , . . . , N m }, p, r, R) be a project problem and let z be a surplus sharing mechanism.
Then, (N,v z ) is convex andv
The following example illustrates the computation of a project game. For the computation of (N,v z ) we use the serial surplus sharing mechanism. Associated to each path N a we have the surplus problem:
if t ≥ 0 and R 1 (t) = 0 otherwise, and z 1 = (0, 369), Letâ ∈ {1, . . . , m} be such that D(r) = D(Nâ, r), i.e. Nâ is responsible of the total delay of the project.
Consider the taxation problem (N, Eâ, câ) given by Eâ = K( i∈Nâ d(i)− i∈Nâ e(i)−slack(Nâ, p)), câ i = yâ i if i ∈ Nâ and câ i = 0 if i ∈ N \ Nâ. Then,
where the second equality follows because D(r) = D(Nâ, r) and the third one is a direct consequence of the definition of Eâ and câ. Moreover, for any S ⊂ N we havē
where the second inequality follows because R is nondecreasing and therefore K is also nondecreasing, and the second equality is a direct consequence of the definitions of Eâ and câ.
Since (Nâ, c (N,Eâ,câ) ) is concave, we know that there is an x ∈ Core(c (N,Eâ,câ) ). Then, i∈N x i = c (N,Eâ,câ) (N ) =c y (N ) and i∈S x i ≤ c (N,Eâ,câ) (S) ≤c y (S) for every S ⊂ N , and therefore x ∈ Core(c y ).
Case 2: D(p) < D(r).
In this case, u yz (N ) =v z (N ) and u yz (S) ≤v z (S) for every S ⊂ N . By Lemma 5.1 we know that (N,v z ) is convex and therefore Core(v z ) = ∅. Let x ∈ Core(v z ), then i∈N x i =v z (N ) = u yz (N ) and i∈S x i ≥v z (S) ≥ u yz (S) for every S ⊂ N , and therefore x ∈ Core(u yz ). 2
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We now show that the core of project games satisfies some basic and desirable properties for solutions of project problems.
In many project problems the general manager of the project does not have legal authority to oblige delayed activities to compensate expedited activities for their contribution to decrease the total delay of the project. In this situation, a set-valued solution should satisfy: if the project is neither delayed, nor expedited, then there should be a solution in which nobody is neither punished, nor rewarded, i.e. if D(r) = D(p), then the zero vector should be a possible solution; if the project is delayed, then there should be a solution in which the delayed activities pay exactly the total cost associated to the total delay, i.e. expedited activities are not compensated; if the project is expedited, then there should be a solution in which the delayed activities don't have to compensate expedited activities, i.e. expedited activities get exactly the total reward associated to the total expedition.
Let D be the set of delayed activities, i.e. D = {i ∈ N |p(i) < r(i)}, and recall that E is the set of expedited activities, i.e. E = {i ∈ N |p(i) > r(i)}.
Theorem 5.3. Let ({N 1 , . . . , N m }, p, r, R) be a project problem, let y and z be a cost and surplus sharing mechanism, respectively, and let (N, u yz ) be the associated project game.
(ii) If D(p) = D(r), then 0 ∈ Core(u yz ). Since f z i = 0 for every i ∈ N \ E, we havev z (S ∪ {i}) =v z (S) for every i ∈ N \ E and therefore x i = 0 for every x ∈ Core(v z ) and i ∈ N \ E. 2
26
Final remarks
We have used cooperative games to find solutions to project problems. The associated project game, in our opinion, provides an adequate thought experiment to evaluate coalitional influence and the core of this game provides a suitable answer to the allocation problem at hand.
Contrary to our focus on finding suitable allocations satisfying some basic properties, Castro, Gómez and Tejada (2007) concentrate on finding a game related to project problems satisfying some "desirable"
properties. They put forward the properties of separability, non-manipulability by splitting, and independent slack and propose a cooperative game to share the total delay or expedition of a project satisfying these three properties. One can question the desirability of these three properties when we concentrate on the allocation of the rewards (or penalties) created by a project that has not performed as planned. For instance, the property of separability says that if a project can be decomposed in two different (sub)projects (i.e. if there is a node used by all paths in the project), then the associated game can be decomposed as the sum of the two games associated to the two corresponding (sub)projects. Note that the total reward of the project does not need to equal the sum of the rewards of the (sub)projects since we allow for non additive reward functions too. Hence, in our setting, separability does not need to be satisfied by project problems, let alone by the associated games.
In our opinion, it is not the properties of the game as a whole that are relevant, but rather the properties of the derived solutions (except of course from adequately modeling the coalitional possibilities).
As mentioned above, Castro, Gómez and Tejada (2007) define a cooperative game to share the total delay or expedition of a project. If one uses the core of this game to share the total reward in a project problem where the reward function is proportional to the total expedition or delay of the project, one encounters unwanted features in the allocations proposed by the core. It turns out that for projects in which the corresponding graph is a line, the game in Castro et al. (2007) is additive (i.e. the value of a coalition equals the sum of the individual values of its members). Therefore, the core of this game does not need to satisfy any of the properties proposed in Section 5. 
